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Climate mitigation policy should be imposed over a long period, and spur development of 
new technologies in order to make stabilization of green house gas concentrations 
economically feasible. The government may announce current and future policy packages that 
stimulate current R&D in climate-friendly technologies. However, once climate-friendly 
technologies have been developed, the government may have no incentive to implement the 
pre-announced future policies, that is, there may be a time inconsistency problem. We show 
that if the government can optimally subsidize R&D today, there is no time inconsistency 
problem. Thus, lack of commitment is not an argument for higher current R&D subsidies. If 
the offered R&D subsidy is lower than the optimal subsidy, the current (sub-game perfect) 
climate tax should exceed the first-best climate tax. 
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Global warming represents man￿ s biggest environmental challenge. In
spite of the fact that current concentration in the atmosphere of green-
house gases (GHGs) is approaching critical levels, global emissions are
steadily increasing. Economic growth in developing countries and pro-
posed stabilization targets for GHG concentrations in the atmosphere
simply do not match easily. Reaching both goals would for instance re-
quire more than twice as much carbon free power by mid-century than
we now derive from fossil fuels (Ho⁄ert et al. 2002). This is a major
technological challenge, and governments in industrialized countries are
currently announcing daunting future emission targets, hoping this will
trigger the right kind of innovations.
If a government announces climate policies, for example, carbon
taxes, to be implemented in the future, ￿rms may increase their R&D
in green technologies today, expecting a reward on their R&D invest-
ment in the future. However, once climate friendly technologies have
been developed, the government may have no incentive to implement
the pre-announced policies. Moreover, if ￿rms have rational expecta-
tions, and the government cannot commit to future carbon taxes, ￿rms
understand that the announced policies will never be implemented, and
hence present R&D in climate friendly technologies will not change.
This paper examines the optimal design of carbon taxes. In our
study, present and future climate taxes increase demand for climate
friendly technologies, and thereby spur present technology development.
Because of a number of externalities in the R&D markets, we show that
implementation of the ￿rst-best outcome requires a subsidy that inter-
nalizes the net e⁄ect of these externalities. Depending on the strength of
the (positive and negative) externalities, this subsidy may be positive or
negative. Moreover, carbon taxes should be imposed, but these should
equal the Pigovian taxes only if there is competitive supply of abatement
technologies.
We show that if the available technology subsidy is the ￿rst-best
one, then both under commitment (open-loop equilibrium) and under
no commitment (subgame perfect equilibrium) the ￿rst-best outcome
will be reached. However, for a number of reasons (see Section 4) the
available technology subsidy may di⁄er from the ￿rst-best one. Under
such an assumption we explore how carbon taxes will be determined un-
der commitment and under no commitment. In particular, we compare
equilibrium carbon taxes under commitment and under no commitment.
We show that if the available subsidy to the government is lower than
the ￿rst-best subsidy, then the future carbon tax under no commitment
is lower than the future carbon tax under commitment. Hence, under
2no commitment the government cannot (credibly) announce a "high"
future carbon tax, that is, a carbon tax at the same level as the tax rate
under commitment. In order to compensate for the lack of a high future
carbon tax, we show that under no commitment the present carbon tax
is increased. This is in line with the informal story above.
There is a strand of literature analyzing the optimal time path of
a carbon tax. In the seminal paper by Wigley et al. (1996), future
costs are discounted and a fraction of the carbon emitted today is re-
moved from the atmosphere by natural processes as time passes. This
suggests to postpone expensive carbon abatement, that is, carbon taxes
should increase over time. However, in the early literature technological
progress was exogenous, and critics claimed that if technological change
were made endogenous results would change.
Goulder and Mathai (2000) was one of the ￿rst contributions which
analyzed the implications of endogenous technological change for the
optimal carbon tax path. Rather surprisingly, they found that if the
government could a⁄ect technological change through a carbon tax, the
government should set lower carbon taxes today, and consequently, also
less carbon abatement would be carried out today. The intuition is
simply that the prospect of technological development made it even more
advantageous to postpone carbon abatement.
In Goulder and Mathai (2000) the government directly decides both
the amount of carbon abatement and the rate of new knowledge accumu-
lation, and it is assumed that all market failures of knowledge creation
are taken care of by other policies than climate policy. Assuming that
the government cannot control the rate of knowledge creation directly by,
for instance, an R&D subsidy, both Gerlagh et al. (2009) and Greaker
and Pade (2009) found that governments should set a higher carbon tax
today if patent protection is imperfect and/or if there is a positive ex-
ternality from present R&D to future R&D. In the present paper, where
there are other types of externalities than imperfect patent protection
and knowledge spillovers, we show that the ￿rst-best taxes are declining
over time. If the available technology subsidy di⁄ers from the ￿rst-best
one, the path of subgame perfect carbon taxes, as well as the ranking
of subgame-perfect carbon taxes relative to ￿rst-best carbon taxes, de-
pends on whether the available technology subsidy exceeds the ￿rst-best
subsidy (which may be positive or negative).
A key issue in the present paper is whether the carbon taxes di⁄er
between the commitment case and the no commitment case. Neither
Gerlagh et al. (2009) nor Greaker and Pade (2009) examine the no
commitment case (subgame-perfect equilibrium). Several decades ago,
Kydland and Prescott (1977) drew attention to ine¢ ciency caused by
3dynamic inconsistency. This insight has proven essential for several pol-
icy areas. It is, however, easy to check that the optimal controls are time
consistent in the model of Goulder and Mathai because the maximiza-
tion problem is time invariant and the two state variables follow smooth
paths, see Greaker and Pade (2009). However, with decentralized de-
cisions by private agents - like in the present paper - time consistency
could be a problem.
The time consistency problemis not new to environmental economics.
For example, Downing and White (1986) examine the ratchet e⁄ect; if
a polluting ￿rm discovers a less polluting process, the government may
tighten the regulation of the ￿rm. Consequently, the innovating pollut-
ing ￿rm may not reap the (naively) expected bene￿ts from their innova-
tion, and R&D investments may not be pro￿table. Downing and White
(1986) conclude that for all other environmental policy instruments than
emission taxes, the ratchet e⁄ect may lead to too little innovation.
Unlike Downing and White, Requate (2005) distinguishes between
the regulated polluting sector, which employs new abatement technol-
ogy, and the R&D sector, which develops new abatement technology.
According to Requate, empirical work shows that more than 90 percent
of environmental innovations reducing air and water pollution are in-
vented by non-polluting ￿rms marketing their technology to polluting
￿rms. This tends to change the incentive structure as the ratchet e⁄ect
often implies a larger market for the innovation.
Our paper di⁄ers from Downing and White (1986) and Requate
(2005) in several respects. While in these contributions there is only
one government making one decision, that is, either before or after the
innovation activity has taken place, we include two governments making
decision at di⁄erent points in time. We thereby aim to model a central
feature of the ongoing negotiations over a Kyoto II treaty: a climate
treaty can commit nations to a climate policy only until some future
year. Later, new governments are not committed.
Unlike Requate (2005) we focus on characterizing the optimal tax
path under di⁄erent policy and commitment alternatives. As stated
above, the optimal tax path depends on whether the available technology
subsidy is higher or lower than the ￿rst-best subsidy. Note that like
Requate (2005) we assume that innovations take place in an R&D sector,
not in the polluting ￿rms.1
1Requate (2005) ￿nds that an emission tax welfare dominates a tradeable quota
system for most commitment alternatives. In the present paper, we only analyze an
emission tax. However, an emission tax is equivalent to a tradeable quota system
in our model because the mark-up in the R&D sector is given. In Requate (2005),
endogenous mark-up is a key driving force.
4Both Alfsen and Eskeland (2007) and Montgomery and Smith (2007)
argue that because a government cannot commit to future tax rates, the
government must increase its support of climate friendly R&D today.
We show that if the government can o⁄er the ￿rst-best technology sub-
sidy to the R&D ￿rms, then the ￿rst-best outcome is reached both under
commitment and under no commitment. Hence, if feasible, the govern-
ment should use the ￿rst-best subsidy, and it is not welfare improving
to increase the subsidy above the ￿rst-best level even if the government
cannot commit to future taxes. Thus, lack of commitment is not an
argument for R&D subsidies above the ￿rst-best level. However, if the
government for various reasons cannot use the ￿rst-best technology sub-
sidy, it should instead adjust the carbon taxes. The adjustment, relative
to the ￿rst-best carbon taxes, depends on whether the o⁄ered technology
subsidy exceeds the ￿rst-best subsidy.
Karp and Tsur (2008) o⁄ers another perspective on time inconsis-
tency. In their paper, time inconsistency is driven by hyperbolic dis-
counting, not innovations. The optimal level of current abatement under
commitment is compared with the optimal level under limited commit-
ment. They ￿nd that present carbon abatement should be highest in
the limited commitment case. This result has some resemblance with
our result when subsidies to R&D are insu¢ cient; the present carbon
tax, and therefore also present abatement, should be higher under no
commitment than under commitment if the applied technology subsidy
falls short of the ￿rst-best subsidy.
The paper is laid out as follows: In Section 2 we present our model,
and in Section 3 we examine the ￿rst-best solution. In Section 4 we
assume that the R&D subsidy cannot be set optimally, and derive the
second best solution. We distinguish between the case in which the
government can commit to future carbon taxes, and the no commitment
case. Lastly, Section 5 sums up and conclude.
2 The model
We use a model with two sectors and two periods. In the R&D sector,
each ￿rm develops one abatement technology. First, the ￿rm develops
an idea - a basic technology concept - at a ￿xed cost. This idea can
then be advanced to a marketable product, which is rented to the carbon
emission sector. The latter sector has a Business-as-Usual (BaU) amount
of emissions related to its production activities, but by renting abatement
equipment from the R&D sector emissions will be reduced. Abatement
technologies are imperfect substitutes, and it is optimal to rent a mix of
all abatement technologies. Remaining carbon emissions are subject to
carbon tax payment to the government.
5In each period there is one government. The objective of a govern-
ment is to minimize total social costs. We ￿rst examine the case where
the government has enough instruments to implement the ￿rst-best so-
cial optimum. In general, this requires the use of carbon taxes as well
as an R&D subsidy. We then consider two cases where each government
only can set the carbon tax optimally.
All development of new ideas takes place in the ￿rst period. Thus,
one way to think of the model is that technologies used to combat climate
change will be developed over the next decades (Period 1 in the model).
Later (period 2 in the model), these concepts will be applied to reduce
carbon emissions. Such an interpretation suggests that the two periods
are of unequal length. It is not di¢ cult to implement periods of unequal
length in the model, however, since it would not change our main results,
we have chosen to keep the two periods equally long.
2.1 The R&D sector
Each ￿rm in the R&D sector develops a unique type of abatement tech-
nology in period 1. First, an R&D ￿rm develops one idea at the ￿xed
development cost F(n) where n is the number of ideas being developed
and F 0(n) > 0; F 00(n) > 0: The average cost of developing an idea is
increasing in the number of ideas, for example, because costs of develop-
ing an idea di⁄er across ideas and the least expensive ideas are assumed
to be developed ￿rst - ￿rms are "￿shing out" the best ideas. Hence, the
￿xed cost of ￿rms is increasing in the number of ￿rms, and therefore the
average ￿xed cost of ￿rms is also increasing in the number of ideas being
developed in a period. Of course, in the R&D sector there is a chance
for duplication, but this would just strengthen our argument because
the probability of duplication is increasing in the number of R&D ￿rms
- with more ￿rms there will be more duplication. A ￿rm discovering that
a competitor has already invented the idea the ￿rm is working on has
to start from scratch, and therefore the average e⁄ort required for each
￿rm to develop a unique technology concept is increasing in the number
of ￿rms. Notice that duplication may be accidental (companies simul-
taneously discovering the same type of improvement), or intentional, as
for example in patent races (see Jones and Williams, 2000).
Once a new idea is developed, there is a constant cost b per period
of producing and marketing one standardized unit of technology, and
this cost is assumed to be identical for all ￿rms in the R&D sector.
The new abatement technology can be rented to the emission sector in
both periods. Supply of abatement equipment services are monopolistic
competitive, and each ￿rm charges a price pt = mb; t = 1;2, where
the markup m > 1 is assumed to be identical across ￿rms. Under our
6assumptions, the amount of technology rented to the emission sector in
period t will be the same across ￿rms, and denoted ut.
Let S be a (positive or negative) subsidy received by each ￿rm in the
R&D sector that develops an idea. The present value of the pro￿ts of a
￿rm in the R&D sector is S + (m ￿ 1)bu1 + ￿(m ￿ 1)bu2 ￿ F(n), where
￿ < 1 is the discount factor. We assume that ￿rms enter until pro￿t is
driven down to zero, that is, the number of R&D ￿rms is determined
from
S + (m ￿ 1)b(u1 + ￿u2) ￿ F(n) = 0: (1)
Relation (1) de￿nes n as a function of S and u1 + ￿u2:
n = F
￿1(S + (m ￿ 1)b(u1 + ￿u2)) ￿ n(S + (m ￿ 1)b(u1 + ￿u2)); (2)
implying that @n
@S = n0 = 1
F0 > 0, @n
@u1 = (m ￿ 1)bn0 > 0, and @n
@u2 =
(m ￿ 1)b￿n0 > 0. Notice in particular that an increase in the future use
of abatement technologies (increased u2) increases the number of new
ideas developed today.
2.2 The emission sector
Emissions in each period are given by "0 ￿ na(ut), where "0 is the BaU
emission level in the emission sector, and a(ut) measures the decline in
emissions from using ut units of one abatement technology. We assume
that a(ut) is increasing in ut and strictly concave. Hence, there are
decreasing returns to each type of abatement equipment. On the other
hand, this e⁄ect can be circumvented by employing more abatement
technologies instead of steadily increasing the use of one particular type.
In each period the emission sector minimizes the sum of emission tax





0 ￿ na(ut)) + nptut
￿
; (3)
where ￿t is the carbon tax rate in period t. Because "0￿na(ut) is actual
emissions in period t, the ￿rst term in (3) is the carbon tax payment.
The second term in (3) is the rental cost of abatement equipment. Using
the equilibrium condition pt = mb this minimization gives
￿ta
0(ut) = mb: (4)
which de￿nes ut as a function of ￿t. Relation (4), together with the pric-
ing rule of the R&D sector (pt = mb), gives the demand for abatement
equipment as ut = u(￿t) where u0(￿) =
a0(u)
￿￿a00(u) > 0. Hence, a higher
7carbon tax in period t will increase the use of each abatement technol-
ogy in this period, which will lead to more abatement technologies being
developed due to @n
@ut > 0. Hence, the number of ideas is increasing in
both tax rates.
3 First-best social optimum
We assume that the marginal social values of emission reductions in
period 1 and 2 are d1 and d2, respectively. These marginal social values
of emission reductions are based on some underlying economic costs
of climate change, which depend on emissions in both periods.2 The
assumption that d1 and d2 are constant seems a reasonable simpli￿cation
for the range of emission changes that our analysis covers.
The social surplus from emission mitigation is the value of the abate-
ment minus the abatement costs and the R&D costs. Denoting the social
surplus by ￿ we thus have
￿ = n[￿(u1;u2) ￿ F(n)]; (5)
where
￿(u1;u1) = [d1a(u1) ￿ bu1] + ￿ [d2a(u2) ￿ bu2] (6)
is the social value of abatement for each type of abatement equipment
minus the cost of using this equipment.
The ￿rst-best optimum is found from maximizing the social surplus
with respect to the number of technologies being developed (n) and the
use of abatement technologies in each period (u1;u2). From (5) and (6)
this gives:
￿1 = d1a
0(u1) ￿ b = 0; (7)
￿
￿1￿2 = d2a
0(u2) ￿ b = 0; (8)
(￿￿F)￿nF
0 = [d1a(u1) + ￿d2a(u2) ￿ b(u1 + ￿u2)]￿[F(n) + nF
0(n)] = 0:
(9)
2A simple "standard" assumption is that climate costs are given by D(At) in
period t, where At is the carbon in the atmosphere in the end of period t: If a
fraction ￿ of emissions in period 1 remains in the atmosphere in period 2, we have
d1 = D0(A1) + ￿￿D0(A2) and d2 = D0(A2): Notice that dt constant is strictly true
only if D00 = 0: For the special case in which we only care about the carbon in the
atmosphere in the end of period 2 we have d2 = (￿￿)￿1d1 > d1: More generally, the
sign of d2 ￿ d1 is ambiguous.
8According to (7) and (8), marginal bene￿t of increased use of an
abatement technology, which is d1a0(u1) in period 1 and d2a0(u2) in pe-
riod 2, should equal the corresponding marginal cost b. Further, accord-
ing to (9) the net social bene￿t of the last idea being developed should
be zero. In other words, the value of lower emissions re￿ ecting that one
more technology is used to abate in both periods, d1a(u1) + ￿d2a(u2),
less the cost of using this technology, b(u1+￿u2), should equal the total
cost of developing this technology. This amounts to one more R&D ￿rm
paying the ￿xed cost of developing a new idea, F(n); and this additional
￿rm increases the ￿xed cost of all R&D ￿rms by nF 0(n).
In the subsequent discussion we let (uFB
2 ;uFB
2 ;nFB) denote the ￿rst-
best optimum given by the above conditions. The government can im-
plement the ￿rst-best solution as follows: First, combining (4) with (7)
and (8) we see that the ￿rst-best emission taxes are given by:
￿
FB
1 = md1; (10)
￿
FB
2 = md2: (11)
Relations (10) and (11) re￿ ect that with a constant mark-up m one
instrument is su¢ cient (in each period) to correct for both market power
and the negative environmental externality3. The emissions taxes are
higher the higher is the mark-up m: a high mark-up implies a high
emission tax, which gives an incentive to rent out more units of the
abatement equipment, thereby correcting the disincentive for a monop-
olist who charges a price in excess of marginal cost. Note that in the
special case where (in the limit) m = 1, that is, the competitive case,
the Pigovian taxes should be imposed.
Relation (9) determines the optimal number of ideas, nFB, when
ut = uFB
t : Using (1) we see that in order to implement the ￿rst-best
solution, the following subsidy should be o⁄ered to each R&D ￿rm;
S
FB = F(n





Relation (12) does not give any guidelines with respect to the sign
of SFB: To this end we combine (9) and (12) to obtain:
d1a(u
FB
1 ) + ￿d2a(u
FB









The left hand side of (13) shows the social value of reducing emis-
sions by the optimal use of abatement equipment in the two periods,
3A similar result was ￿rst derived by Buchanan (1969).
9d1a(uFB
1 ) + ￿d2a(uFB
2 ); less gross revenue in the R&D sector of renting
out these amounts, mb(uFB
1 + ￿uFB
2 ). As long as this di⁄erence is pos-
itive, only a part of the social value of using the abatement equipment
accrues to an R&D ￿rm, and hence, too few ideas will be invented.4
This e⁄ect, which is often termed the appropriation e⁄ect, see, for ex-
ample, Tirole (1997, ch. 10), suggests to o⁄er a subsidy to R&D ￿rms
in order to reach the optimal number of new abatement technologies.
On the other hand, free entry into the R&D sector drives up R&D costs
(F 0(n) > 0), and all R&D ￿rms su⁄er from this externality, nFBF 0(nFB).
Jones and Williams (2000) coin this the "stepping on toes" e⁄ect. This
negative cost externality tends to yield too much entry from a welfare
point of view, that is, too much technology development, which suggests
to impose a tax on R&D ￿rms. To sum up, in order to implement the
￿rst-best outcome the government should o⁄er a subsidy to R&D ￿rms
if and only if the appropriation e⁄ect exceeds the stepping on toes e⁄ect.
The discussion above gives us the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The ￿rst-best outcome can be implemented by the envi-
ronmental taxes ￿FB
1 = md1 and ￿FB
2 = md2 combined with a subsidy
SFB = (m￿1)b(uFB
1 +￿uFB
2 )￿F(nFB). This subsidy should be positive
if the appropriation e⁄ect exceeds the stepping on toes e⁄ect, but negative
if the stepping on toes e⁄ect exceeds the appropriation e⁄ect.
If the stepping on toes e⁄ect is larger than the appropriation e⁄ect,
the government should tax each idea. This may sound odd, but remem-
ber that in our model there are no knowledge spillover between R&D
￿rms, which would have provided an additional argument for an R&D
subsidy.
4 Second-best social optimum
In this section we examine the case in which governments cannot set
an optimal subsidy to R&D ￿rms. First, it may be di¢ cult for the
governments to identify good ideas worthy of support and deny bad
ideas support, see, for example, Cohen and Noll (1991). Second, once
there is a subsidy innovators may spend time chasing for government
funds. Whereas this may be rational and bene￿cial for an agent, it is
a loss for society. Third, subsidy programs require funding, and public
spending may have a higher opportunity cost than private spending.
4Whereas d1a(uFB
1 ) + ￿d2a(uFB
2 ) is independent of the mark-up m; the term
mb(uFB
1 + ￿uFB
2 ) is increasing in m: Hence, for a large enough m the appropriation
e⁄ect is negative. Note that for the limiting case of m = 1 we know from the
￿rst-order condition for optimal number of abatement technologies, see (9), that the
appropriation e⁄ect is positive.
10In the commitment case (Section 4.1), the government in period 1
can force the government in period 2 to set a certain tax rate in the
second period, that is, the government in period 1 determines the carbon
taxes in both periods (The open-loop solution). However, this type of
commitment is seldom possible, and hence in Section 4.2 we also discuss
the sub-game perfect equilibrium in the two stage game between the
governments.
4.1 Open-loop solution
From (4) we know that ￿nding the optimal taxes is equivalent to ￿nding
the optimal use of abatement equipment of each type in the two periods,
i.e. ￿nding u1 and u2. As before, social surplus is given by (5). However,
in the present case the subsidy S is not determined by optimization, but
given exogenously by S0 (which may be equal to zero). When choosing
u1 and u2 we must therefore take into consideration that the number of
ideas (i.e. n) depends on this choice, see (2). The optimal values of u1
and u2 must therefore satisfy




= 0 t = 1;2 (14)
Can the ￿rst-best values (uFB
2 ;uFB
2 ), and thus the ￿rst-best taxes
(￿FB
1 ;￿FB
2 ), be the solution of (14)? The ￿rst-best values imply that the
￿rst terms in (14) are zero, see (7) and (8). Thus, the ￿rst-best optimum
can only be the solution to (14) when the term in square brackets is zero
(remembering that @n
@ut > 0). This in turn requires that the exogenously
given subsidy equals the ￿rst-best subsidy, see (9). Consequently, if the
term in square brackets di⁄ers from zero the ￿rst-best taxes cannot be
the solution. In the Appendix we prove the following proposition (under
a weak regularity assumption):
Proposition 2 If the available technology subsidy S0 is equal to the
￿rst-best subsidy SFB; the open-loop carbon taxes coincide with the ￿rst-
best carbon taxes, ￿OL
t = ￿FB
t . If S0 < SFB, then in each time period
the open-loop carbon tax exceeds the ￿rst-best carbon tax, ￿OL
t > ￿FB
t . If
S0 > SFB, then in each time period the ￿rst-best carbon tax exceeds the
open-loop carbon tax, ￿FB
t > ￿OL
t .
The intuition for our result is straight forward. A positive ￿rst-
best subsidy stimulates the development of more abatement technologies.
If the government cannot use this subsidy to the desired extent, for
example, there is no subsidy (S0 = 0), carbon taxes should be increased,
relative to the ￿rst-best taxes, in order to spur more R&D. This intuition
is correct irrespective of the sign of the ￿rst-best subsidy as long as the
11available subsidy is lower than the ￿rst-best subsidy. Correspondingly,
if the o⁄ered subsidy exceeds the ￿rst-best subsidy, the subsidy tends to
attract too many R&D ￿rms. Carbon taxes should then be reduced -
relative to the ￿rst-best taxes - in order to decrease pro￿ts in the R&D
sector, thereby lowering the number of ￿rms entering the R&D sector.
By departing from the ￿rst best tax rates, the government incurs a
loss from too much, or too little, abatement, that is, marginal abate-
ment cost will not equal marginal environmental damage. This loss is
increasing in the tax rate, and hence, it is better to spread the loss over
both periods by manipulating both tax rates.
4.2 Sub-game perfect equilibrium
We now examine the sub-game perfect equilibrium in the game between
the current government and the future government. In period 2, the
future government determines the carbon tax ￿PE
2 that maximizes the
social surplus in this period. Because there is no R&D in period 2, the
number of abatement technologies, n; is predetermined. Also, the use
of abatement technologies in period 1, u1, is predetermined. Hence, the
future government chooses u2 to maximize (5), taking u1 and n as given.
Clearly, this implies that (8) must hold, i.e. uPE
2 = uFB




The government in period 1 chooses u1 to maximize social surplus,
taking into account that u2 = uFB
2 . As before, n depends on u1, see (2).
Maximizing (5) is this case therefore gives us (14) for t = 1: It follows
that the ￿st-best optimum uFB
1 is a solution to our current problem only
if the term in square brackets in (14) is zero for t = 1. This corresponds
to the situation in which the exogenously given subsidy equals the ￿rst-
best subsidy; S0 = SFB. The following proposition summarizes this
￿nding:
Proposition 3 If the o⁄ered R&D subsidy S0 equals to ￿rst-best subsidy
SFB, the sub-game perfect carbon taxes are equal to the ￿rst-best carbon
taxes, and thus there is no time inconsistency problem.
If the available subsidy for some reason di⁄ers from the ￿rst-best
subsidy, the ￿rst-best tax in period 1 implies that the term in square
brackets in (14) di⁄ers from zero for t = 1, and hence this tax is not part
of the solution of the game. In the Appendix we prove that the carbon
tax path in the three cases - ￿rst best, open loop solution and sub-game
perfect equilibrium - can be characterized as follows5:
5The formal proof in the Appendix does not cover the case where S0 ￿ SFB is
positive and large. On the other hand, this case seems to be less likely.







2 : In the opposite case,







If the ￿rst-best subsidy SFB exceeds the exogenously given subsidy
S0, the government would like to announce that the carbon tax in period
2 will exceed the ￿rst-best carbon tax (￿2 > ￿FB
2 ) in order to stimulate
R&D. However, if the government in Period 1 cannot commit to this
high (open loop) carbon tax, that is, if the agents know that once they
are in Period 2 the carbon tax that will actually be imposed will be
equal to the ￿rst-best carbon tax (￿PE
2 = ￿FB
2 ), the government will
increase the first period tax relative to the open-loop tax (￿PE
1 > ￿OL
1 )
to compensate for the lack of a high period 2 tax. Hence, because the
government is "forced" to lower the carbon tax in period 2, it is optimal
to increase the carbon tax in period 1 even further above the ￿rst-best
carbon tax (than in the open-loop solution) in order to stimulate R&D.
In the opposite case, that is, S0 exceeds SFB; the government cannot
credibly commit to a carbon tax in period 2 below the ￿rst-best carbon
tax. In order to compensate for the lack of a low carbon tax in period




5 Discussion and conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to study and compare equilibrium carbon
taxes under endogenous technology development of climate-friendly tech-
nologies. To simplify, we use a two-period model in which technology
progress takes place in the ￿rst period and the new technology is used in
both periods. There are positive and negative externalities in the R&D
sector, and each developed abatement technology is unique and there-
fore supplied by one (monopolistic) agent. We show that the ￿rst-best
outcome can be reached through a technology subsidy and carbon taxes.
The sign of the subsidy depends on the strength of the externalities, and
will be positive if the appropriation e⁄ect exceeds the stepping on toes
e⁄ect. The ￿rst-best carbon taxes are decreasing over time. If the ￿rst-
best subsidy is o⁄ered to the R&D ￿rms, then the ￿rst-best outcome
will be reached both under commitment (open-loop solution) and un-
der no commitment (sub-game perfect equilibrium). In both cases, the
￿rst-best taxes will be implemented.
If the ￿rst-best subsidy is not o⁄ered to the R&D ￿rms, the equi-
librium under commitment will di⁄er from the ￿rst-best outcome, and
it will also be time inconsistent. Imposing time consistency through
sub-game perfectness, we show that the ranking of the carbon taxes
under ￿rst best, commitment and no commitment depends on whether
13the available subsidy is higher or lower than the ￿rst-best subsidy. If
the ￿rst-best subsidy exceeds the o⁄ered subsidy, the government would
ideally like to o⁄er a high carbon tax in period 2 to spur present R&D.
We have shown that in this case it is not time consistent to o⁄er a high
carbon tax in period 2, and therefore under no commitment the govern-
ment will compensate the lack of a high carbon tax in period 2 through
a high carbon tax in period 1. Hence, under no commitment the carbon
tax in period 1 (2) is higher (lower) than the carbon tax under commit-
ment. If the available technology subsidy exceeds the ￿rst-best subsidy,
which may re￿ ect successful lobbying from the R&D sector, the ranking
is opposite.
In our analysis we have a number of simplifying assumptions. As
pointed out in the paper, relaxing the assumptions of no decay parameter
and periods of equal length would not change any of our propositions,
just lead to more involved equations. Another simplifying assumption
is no R&D in Period 2. As far as we can see, this does not in￿ uence
the basic ranking of the carbon taxes between ￿rst-best, commitment
and no commitment. With R&D in both periods, implementation of
the ￿rst-best solution requires a technology subsidy in both periods.
Suppose the available subsidies di⁄er form the ￿rst-best ones. Yet, the
basic mechanism in our model - seen from period 1 - that the future
carbon tax a⁄ects current R&D - still applies. Also with R&D in period
2, the government in period 2 would - when setting the period 2 carbon
tax - not take account of the R&D in period 1 simply because it is
predetermined in period 2. Thus, under no commitment the government
in period 1 adjusts the tax rate relative to the open-loop solution also
when there is R&D in period 2. Of course, the adjustment will depend
on the o⁄ered technology subsidies relative to the ￿rst-best subsidies.
In our model the mark-up is constant. This is clearly a simpli￿cation,
and it is correct only under a constant elasticity of demand. On the other
hand, an endogenous mark-up would not a⁄ect the basic message in the
paper.
We have modelled only one cause for the appropriation e⁄ect; because
of monopoly supply without price discrimination only a part of the social
value of a new abatement equipment accrues to the R&D ￿rm. In reality,
there may be more reasons for an appropriation e⁄ect. First, patents
may be copied and consequently the innovating ￿rm loses its monopoly.
Second, there may be positive knowledge spillovers from current R&D
to future R&D. In a study which includes these appropriation e⁄ects, as
well as the stepping on toes e⁄ect, Jones and Williams (2000) conclude
that R&D is typically too small in a market economy without R&D
subsidies. To the extent this holds also for R&D on climate-friendly
14technologies, the government should o⁄er a positive technology subsidy.
If this subsidy is below the ￿rst-best one, the government should rather
go for high carbon taxes now than fall back on promising high carbon
taxes in the future.
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 2 and 4
Proof of Proposition 2
De￿ne the funcion ￿(S) as the maximized social surplus for a given
subsidy. From (5) we have
￿(S) = max
u1;u2
n[￿(u1;u2) ￿ F(n)]; (15)
where n is given by (2). The function ￿(S) gives the social surplus in
the open-loop case for an exogenous S. In the ￿rst-best optimum, S is
chosen so that ￿(S) is maximized, giving S = SFB.
From the envelope theorem, we have
￿
0(S) = [￿ ￿ F ￿ nF
0]n
0(S): (16)
We now make the following regularity assumption:
￿
0(S)>0 for S < S
FB
￿
0(S)<0 for S > S
FB
By the de￿nition of SFB, this condition must hold for S close to SFB.
Our regularity assumption is that the condition holds for all relevant
values of S.
Together with (16) and n0(S) > 0, our regularity assumption implies
that
[￿ ￿ F ￿ nF
0]>0 for S < S
FB (17)
[￿ ￿ F ￿ nF
0]<0 for S > S
FB
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16while the ￿rst-best values (uFB
1 ;uFB
2 ) where given by similar expressions
but with zeros on the right hand sides. Since a00 < 0 and @n
@ut > 0, it
follows that uOL
t > uFB
t if [￿ ￿ F ￿ nF 0] > 0 and that uOL
t < uFB
t if
[￿ ￿ F ￿ nF 0] < 0. Remembering that ut is strictly increasing in ￿t,
Proposition 2 follows from (17).
Proof of Proposition 4
The condition for the optimal value of u1 in the sub-game perfect equi-
librium is (14) for t = 1, which may be written as
￿(u1;u2) ￿ ￿1(u1;u2) + T(u1;u2) = 0; (18)
where
T(u1;u2) = [￿(u1;u2) ￿ F(n) ￿ nF
0(n)](m ￿ 1)bn
0;
and where n depends on u1 and u2, see (2).








where ￿1 < 0 from the second oreder conditions. The sign of
du1
du2 is
therefore equal to the sign of ￿2. If ￿2 < 0, a change in u2 from uOL
2 in
the direction of uFB
2 will give a change in u1 in the opposite direction,




2 has the same sign as uOL
2 ￿ uFB
2 ). Remembering that ut is strictly
increasing in ￿t, Proposition 4 must therefore hold if ￿2 < 0.
Using (6) and (18), we ￿nd














Because n0 = 1
F0(n), we have n00 = ￿F00n0
(F0)2 , implying that n00
n0 = ￿F00
(F0)2 =
￿F 00(n0)2. Moreover, T = (m ￿ 1)b￿0(S). The equation above may
therefore be written as:















We know that ￿[2F 0 + nF 00] @n
@u2 < 0: A su¢ cient condition for ￿2 <
0 is therfore that the ￿rst and last term (including the minus sign)
17in curly brackets are both negative. This will for sure be the case if
S0 < SFB, since in this case we have ￿0(S) > 0 and d2a0(u2) ￿ b. We
have thus proved Proposition 4 for the case in which S0 < SFB (and
thus uOL
2 > uFB
2 from Proposition 2).
The proof above implies that Proposition 4 is also valid for S0 > SFB
(and thus uOL
2 < uFB
2 ) as long as S0 is su¢ ciently close to SFB, so that
the positive terms ￿ [d2a0(u2) ￿ b] and ￿￿F 00n0￿0(S) are small enough to
be dominated by [2F 0 + nF 00] @n
@u2.
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